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Choice Blindness is a research paradigm originally inspired by techniques from the domain of close-up card-magic, which permits us to manipulate the relationship between what people choose, and what they actually get. We have investigated choice blindness in domains such as aesthetic-, moral-, political- and consumer choice, and in the modalities of vision, voice, taste and smell, and we have consistently found that participants often fail to notice mismatches between what they choose and what they get. In addition, we have found that participants often confabulate arguments why they actually prefer the alternative they had initially rejected. You can read more about choice blindness here.
The current study is the first to investigate confabulatory introspection in relation to clinical psychological symptoms utilizing the Choice Blindness Paradigm (CBP). It was hypothesized that those with obsessive-compulsive symptoms are more like- ly to confabulate mental states. To test this hypothesis, an experimental choice blindness task was administered in two nonclinical samples (n = 47; n = 76). Re- sults showed that a confabulatory introspection is significantly related to obsessive- compulsive symptoms. There was evidence for its specificity to symptoms of OCD depending on the obsessional theme addressed in the choice blindness task. How- ever, confabulatory introspection was also found to be relevant to other symptoms, including depression and schizotypy. The results highlight a potentially fruitful new area of clinical investigation in the area of insight and self-knowledge, not limited to OCD alone, but potentially other disorders as well.
Choice blindness is the finding that participants both often fail to notice mismatches between their decisions and the outcome of their choice and, in addition, endorse the opposite of their chosen alternative. But do these preference reversals also carry over to future choices and ratings? To investigate this question, we gave participants the task of choosing which of a pair of faces they found most attractive. Unknown to them, we sometimes used a card trick to exchange one face for the other. Both decision theory and common sense strongly suggest that most people would easily notice such a radical change in the outcome of a choice. But that was not the case: no more than a third of the exchanges were detected by the participants. We also included a second round of choices using the same face pairs, and two stages of post‐choice attractiveness ratings of the faces. This way we were able to measure preference strength both as choice consistency and by looking at measures of rating differences between chosen and rejected options. We found that the initially rejected faces were chosen more frequently in the second choice, and the perceived attractiveness of these faces was increased even in uncoupled individual ratings at the end of the experiment. This result is discussed in relation to Chen and Risen’s recent criticism of the Free Choice Paradigm, as it shows that choices can affect future preferences.
Political candidates often believe they must focus their campaign efforts on a small number of swing voters open for ideological change. Based on the wisdom of opinion polls, this might seem like a good idea. But do most voters really hold their political attitudes so firmly that they are unreceptive to persuasion? We tested this premise during the most recent general election in Sweden, in which a left- and a right-wing coalition were locked in a close race. We asked our participants to state their voter intention, and presented them with a political survey of wedge issues between the two coalitions. Using a sleight-of-hand we then altered their replies to place them in the opposite political camp, and invited them to reason about their attitudes on the manipulated issues. Finally, we summarized their survey score, and asked for their voter intention again. The results showed that no more than 22% of the manipulated replies were detected, and that a full 92% of the participants accepted and endorsed our altered political survey score. Furthermore, the final voter intention question indicated that as many as 48% were willing to consider a left-right coalition shift. This can be contrasted with the established polls tracking the Swedish election, which registered maximally 10% voters open for a swing. Our results indicate that political attitudes and partisan divisions can be far more flexible than what is assumed by the polls, and that people can reason about the factual issues of the campaign with considerable openness to change.
What exactly are opinions? What does it mean to express an attitude? Given the ubiquitous use of surveys, polls and rating scales, it seems we ought to have firm answers to these fundamental questions, but we do not. Here we present a novel approach to investigate the nature of attitudes. We created a self-transforming paper survey of moral opinions, covering both foundational principles, and current dilemmas hotly debated in the media. This survey ‘magically’ exposed participants to a reversal of their previously stated attitudes, allowing us to record whether they were prepared to endorse and argue for the opposite view of what they had stated only moments ago. The result showed that the majority of the reversals remained undetected, and a full 69% of the participants failed to detect at least one of two changes. In addition, participants often constructed coherent and unequivocal arguments supporting the opposite of their original position. These results suggest a dramatic potential for flexibility in our moral attitudes, and indicates a clear role for self-attribution and post-hoc rationalization in attitude formation and change.
Aardema, F, Johansson, P, Hall, L, Paradisis, S-M, Zidani, M and Roberts, S (2014) Choice Blindness, Confabulatory Introspection, and Obsessiv-Compulsion Symptoms: A New Era of Investigation. International Journal of Cognitive Therapy, 7(1), 83-102 [PDF]
Johansson, P., Hall, L., Tärning, B., Sikström, S., & Chater, N. (2013). Choice Blindness and Preference Change: You Will Like This Paper Better If You (Believe You) Chose to Read It! Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. DOI:10.1002/bdm.1807. [PDF]
Hall, L., Strandberg, T., Pärnamets, P., Lind, A., Tärning, B. and Johansson, P. (2013). How the Polls Can Be Both Spot On and Dead Wrong: Using Choice Blindness to Shift Political Attitudes and Voter Intentions. PLoS ONE 8(4): e60554. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060554. [Link]
Hall, L., Johansson, P., & de Léon, D. (2013). Recomposing the Will: Distributed motivation and computer mediated extrospection. In T. Vierkant, A. Clark & J. Kiverstein (Eds.) (2013). Decomposing the will. Oxford University Press: Philosophy of Mind Series. pp. 298-324. [PDF]
Hall, L., Johansson, P., & Strandberg, T. (2012). Lifting the veil of morality: choice blindness and attitude reversals on a self-transforming survey. PloS one, 7(9), e45457. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045457 [PDF]
Johansson, P., Hall, L., & Gärdenfors, P. (2011). Choice blindness and the nonunitary nature of the human mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(1), 28- 29.
Hall, L., Johansson, P., Tärning, B., Sikström, S.,&Deutgen, T. (2010). Magic at the marketplace: Choice blindness for the taste of jam and the smell of tea. Cognition, 117(1), 54–61. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.06.010 [PDF]
Johansson, L., Hall, L., & Chater, N. (2011). Preference change through choice. In R. Dolan & T. Sharot (Eds.) (2011). Neuroscience of Preference and Choice. Elsevier Academic Press. pp. 121-141. [PDF]
Johansson, Hall & Sikström 2008 - From Change Blindness to Choice Blindness. Psychologia, 51, 142-155.
Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. (2005). Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task. Science (New York, N.Y.), 310(5745), 116–9. doi:10.1126/science.1111709. [PDF]