Frameworks for properties: Possible worlds vs. conceptual spaces

Peter Gärdenfors Pp. 383-407 in Language, Knowledge, and Intentionality, ed. by L. Haaparanta, M. Kusch, and I. Niiniluoto (Acta Philosophica Fennica. 49), Helsinki.

Abstract

It is argued that the traditional kind of model theory used in intensional semantics is not the right kind of framework for its purpose. The discussion in this paper is focussed on the notion of a property. First, the standard intensional definition of a property, which is formulated in terms of possible worlds, is presented. Some of the philosophical problems this definition leads to are outlined. As a remedy, conceptual spaces are suggested as an appropriate framework for semantics. Conceptual spaces consist of a number of Õquality dimensionsÕ which are often derived from perceptual mechanisms. It is demonstrated how such spaces can be used as a basis for a new criterion of what a property is. This criterion is shown to elude the problems of the traditional approach. Furthermore, it is argued that the criterion is useful for understanding prototype effects of properties and the role of properties in non-monotonic reasoning.

The paper is available in PostScript format (get).

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