Induction and the evolution of conceptual spaces

Peter Gärdenfors In Charles Peirce and the Philosophy of Science: Papers from the Harvard Sesquicentennial Conference, ed. by E.C. Moore, University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, pp. 72-88. Swedish translation published in Blotta tanken (1992h).

Abstract

Peirce notes (CP 2.753) that there are certain forms of evolutionary constraints that delimit the vast class of human inductive inferences. The paper focuses on the problem of projectible proper-ties which is analyzed in relation to modern cognitive science. In particular, the notion of a conceptual space is introduced and it is shown how this can be used to identify projectible properties. Furthermore, I outline how the so called prototype theory of concept formation can be interpreted in terms of conceptual spaces. The evolutionary origin of conceptual spaces is discussed. It is argued that the emerging picture of which predicates can be used in inductive inferences can be seen as an elaboration of Peirce's views.

The paper is available in PostScript format (get).

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