Haaparanta

Existence and Propositional Attitudes: A Fregean Analysis

Leila Haaparanta

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Keywords: Frege, Cognition, Logic, Propositional attitude.

Abstract: It is a commonly held view that Frege's doctrine of senses and references is not compatible with the idea that there are de re beliefs. The present article is meant to challenge that view. It is argued that the proper treatment of Frege's views requires the acknowledgment of the central role of individualistic epistemology in his thought. Once that feature is recognized, Frege's doctrine of senses and references can be considered a theory, or at least a sketch of a theory, of cognition, which has interesting connections with Kant's and Husserl's views.

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Leila Haaparanta,
Professor of Philosophy
Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Philosophy
University of Tampere

Spinning Ideas, Electronic Essays
Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors on His Fiftieth Birthday


	Existence and Propositional Attitudes: A Fregean Analysis
	Leila Haaparanta
	[Back to paper list] [Start page] [Alphabetical index]
	Keywords: Frege, Cognition, Logic, Propositional attitude.
	Abstract: It is a commonly held view that Frege's doctrine of senses and references is not compatible with the idea that there are de re beliefs. The present article is meant to challenge that view. It is argued that the proper treatment of Frege's views requires the acknowledgment of the central role of individualistic epistemology in his thought. Once that feature is recognized, Frege's doctrine of senses and references can be considered a theory, or at least a sketch of a theory, of cognition, which has interesting connections with Kant's and Husserl's views.

	Click here to obtain the paper in PDF format.
	Leila Haaparanta, Professor of Philosophy Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Philosophy University of Tampere

Spinning Ideas, Electronic Essays Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors on His Fiftieth Birthday