A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake
	Wlodek Rabinowicz Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen
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	Keywords: Value, Intrinsic, Final value, Relational properties, Internal properties, Supervenience, Projectivism, Preferentialism, Moore, Kagan, Korsgaard
	Abstract: The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic, i.e., it need not supervene on the object's internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. Such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely motivated by a mistaken belief that appropriate responses to value must consist in preferring and/or promoting. A pluralist approach to value analysis, accoding to which diffrent kinds of values call for different kinds of response, obviates the need for reduction: the final value of a thing or a person can be given an independent interpretation in terms of the appropriate thing- or person-oriented responses: admiration, love, respect, protection, cherishing, etc..
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	Wlodek Rabinowicz Wlodek.Rabinowicz@fil.lu.se Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen Toni.Ronnow-Rasmussen@fil.lu.se Department of Philosophy Kungshuset, Lundagård S-222 22 Lund, Sweden
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