

CONCEPTIONS OF ANGER AND GRIEF IN THE JAPANESE, SWEDISH AND AMERICAN CULTURES

– The role of metaphor in conceptual processes

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1. BACKGROUND

People are explanatory creatures with a tendency to seek understanding: to form explanations and interpretations of their experiences. In particular, this is true for experiences of *emotions*. In order to *make sense* of¹ emotional events and situations – whether directly perceived/experienced or presented in a story, in a film, and so on – human beings *do* – and necessarily so – make use of *some kind of conceptions* – ideas, beliefs, ‘theories’.² For instance:

- In order to predict that a person who displays intense anger towards someone will thereafter feel less angry, one relies on a belief that *anger goes away if one expresses it*.
- In order to interpret someone’s reaction as ‘I had the feeling that he was, nevertheless, very depressed, although I could not tell by looking at him’, one uses a conception of a *distinction and yet a relation between internal, felt emotion on the one hand and displayed emotion on the other*.
- In explaining why a person has been frequently ill during the past few weeks, by referring to the fact that the person’s best

friend has moved away far away, one relies on an idea of *sadness as something that can cause physical illness*.

- In order to view a situation such as that ‘my anger suddenly struck me without me understanding it’ or such as that ‘my sadness just keeps growing’, one uses an idea of *sadness as something that has a kind of agent-status*, i.e., that it exists and ‘does things’ independently, to some extent, of oneself.

Such *conceptions* are often ‘unconscious’ or ‘not immediately accessible to verbalization’, as they are, to some extent, what one *perceives with* – not what one *perceives*. Furthermore, they seem to vary to some extent between cultures and between individuals.

I am involved in a project of investigating the issue of differences in the *conceptualization of*³ (i.e., manners of thinking and reasoning about, attitudes towards, models of) the emotions *anger* and *grief*⁴ in individuals within the American, Swedish and Japanese cultures. In particular, I am concerned with conceptions of the *control of* and the *display of* these emotions: What is involved in *showing* or *not showing* one’s anger or grief? *Why* does a person show it or not? What are the *consequences* of displaying or not displaying one’s grief or anger, respectively? *Should* one try to display, or not to display, these emotions? What different ways of ‘managing’ intense anger or sadness are there?

I focus on ‘*metaphorical conceptions*’. Examples of such conceptions (or, more exactly, of aspects of such

¹Interpret, reason about, explain, predict, etc.

²Compare Harris’ (1989) research on conceptions of emotions from a developmental–psychological perspective. Harris argues that the interpretations and ways of reasoning of young children, when they are making predictions or are explaining emotional situations, indicate that they are not just detecting empirical associations between situations and responses, but that they are making use of conceptions or theories, in the sense of ‘structures of unobservable ‘entities’ used to explain and predict certain observable events’.

³The term ‘conceptualization’, which I use interchangeably with ‘conception’ and ‘concept’, has the advantage of stressing the *process* character of cognition.

⁴Or anger/irritation and grief/sadness/sorrow

conceptions) are, for instance, conceiving of a person who is very sad as a person who is *drowning in sorrow*; of someone who is trying not to show her anger as someone who is trying to *bridle* her anger; of not showing intense anxiety as *bottling up* one's anxiety, or as *handling* one's anxiety; of grief as a *disease* that one can be *cured* from, etc.

Normally, one thinks of *metaphors* as *linguistic phenomena*, and it seems that there is, in all languages, an abundance of metaphors⁵ for describing feelings and emotions.

But I am concerned with whether metaphorical processes are involved in and influence *cognitive processes* that are *not primarily or specifically linguistic*. Are metaphorical processes involved in how people conceive of and reason about emotional *events* and *situations* of anger and grief? Are they involved in how people *interpret experiences* – also when the *experience* does not consist in attempting to understand a *text* or solve a *linguistic task*?

A *conceptual metaphor* is a cognitive structure or construction that represents one phenomenon as something else. For instance:

- fear as *an opponent* (you can *wrestle with* your fear, fear can *overcome you*, you can be suddenly *attacked* by fear, you can *struggle in vain against* your fear, you can be incapable of *mastering* or *controlling* your fear, you can *attempt to conquer* your fear)
- grief as *a superior* (grief can *dominate* your actions, your grief can *prevent you from* doing something, your actions can be *dictated by* sorrow, grief can *reign* in your inner)
- anger as *a sickness* (you can be *sick with* anger, you can be *plagued* by anger, you can *get over* your anger, you can be *cured from* anger)

By a conceptual metaphor, *one kind* of phenomenon is structured by means of *another kind* of phenomenon, in that information and thought structures are transferred from one conceptual domain to another.

I work with the following hypotheses:

(1) *Linguistic metaphors* – metaphorical expressions – are often not separate and isolated, but form whole

⁵In the sense of *linguistic expression* in which words are being used, that also – and, often, *primarily* or *more frequently* – apply to a clearly different domain than the current one, where the expression is *metaphorical*. For instance 'I am feeling up' (cf. 'the balloon moved up the sky'); 'He *attacked* all my arguments, one after another' (cf. 'they *attacked* all our fortifications, one after another'.)

systems. What *ties together* such systems of linguistic metaphors, and in some sense *generates* them, are precisely *conceptual metaphors*.

(2) *Conceptual metaphors* are involved in *cognitive processes* such as perception, planning, reasoning, the formation of standpoints, attitude formation, etc.

As examples, consider the following:

- One group of politicians speak of a slum area in terms of *a cancer*, that might *spread onto the healthy tissue* around it, and which ought to be *removed* or *eliminated*. Another group of politicians speak of the slum area in terms of *a person* temporarily *suffering from a disease*, and who ought to be *rehabilitated*. These groups of politicians also differ in their proposals concerning what actions should be taken in and with the slum area, for instance, with respect to the role of the inhabitants of the slum – how *active* they can/should be – and to what extent current structures and activities of this group of people should be maintained/developed, etc. (Example adapted from Nudler (1990)).
- Someone talking of *discussions* or *debates* in terms of fighting ('I tried to demolish her arguments', 'Don't use that strategy with him, he'll wipe you out', 'she attacked every weak point she could find in my arguments', 'that criticism was right on target') is using one kind of metaphor, and someone talking of discussions in terms of constructing a house together ('That's a good base', 'That is one building brick, now let me add another', 'I don't find that there is enough support for that idea') is using another kind of metaphor. These individuals will probably also *view* discussions differently, for instance, concerning what is a *good* discussion, and *behave* differently in discussions. (Fictive example, adapted from Lakoff and Johnson (1979).)

The background to my approach to *metaphors* are some studies within *cognitive semantics*, in particular, G. Lakoff's and Z. Kövecses' research on *the concept of anger* in American language and culture (Lakoff (1987) and Kövecses (1990)). I am, in particular, interested in two proposals that they put forth in their paper:

- Metaphors for anger are not just a matter of 'mere words'. They do not just influence language processes as such, but also how people *view* anger, how they *interpret*, *experience* and *reason about* situations involving anger.

- Some *conceptual metaphors* of anger are *culturally invariant* and biologically based.

My study takes its departure from Lakoff and Kövecses' study; extending it, though, in certain respects: towards including *grief* and anger; towards including the American, *Swedish* and *Japanese* languages and cultures; and, in particular combining linguistic analysis with *psychological* methods of investigation.

There are two main goals in the study:

(1) To gain knowledge about significant variation in conceptions of anger and grief, and the control and display of these emotions between individuals and between the three cultures – and thus, among other things, to illuminate the question of what aspects of these conceptions of emotions and emotional control are *universal* or *culturally invariant*, and which are *culturally bound*.

(2) To gain knowledge about how conceptualization concerning anger and grief can be conveyed by conceptual metaphors, and thus illuminate the question of the *cognitive status* of metaphors.

2. VARIATION VERSUS SIMILARITIES

I am interested in *variation* in the conceptualization of anger and grief – between *individuals* as well as between *cultures*. However, I would like to indicate the *framework within* which this investigation of *differences* shall be situated. I do not, namely, regard either *emotions* or *conceptions of emotions* as matters of 'free construction' – either on an individual or on a cultural level.

(1) First, I do not agree with those emotion theorists who argue that the experience and conception of emotions is only a matter of an individual's cognitive construction, based upon socially situated learning.⁶ Instead, I believe that emotional situations and events involve information that is meaningful to *any human being* – also a very *young* individual – simply as a member of *homo sapiens*. ('Meaningful' here means that the individual can use this information for discriminating between different emotional situations, and act according to this.) It is not necessary to *learn* social norms, customs and so on, in order to grasp certain emotions and attribute them to oneself and others. It is not necessary that the *social surrounding* provides the child with an interpretation in order for it to have some idea at all about what emotions itself, or someone else, is experiencing.

⁶ See, for instance, Lewis, M. and L. Michalson (1983); Harré, R. (1987).

(2) *Certain aspects* of emotional experiences and conceptions, though, *are learned*. All of *these*, however, are, I believe, *not culturally specific*. There is evidence that there are at least some conceptions or 'scripts' concerning emotions that children *gain* or *construct* independently of in *what* culture they grow up. That is, emotional experience and conceptions are not just freely '*constructed*' by each culture. And there are good reasons why this should be so. Emotional mechanisms, as fundamental orientational and motivational mechanisms, are biologically rooted in *homo sapiens*. Also certain mechanisms for 'controlling' and 'dealing with' emotions and emotional expression can be assumed to be biologically grounded. Therefore, it is likely that important elements of emotional phenomena – and of conceptions of emotions – are culturally invariant.

On the other hand, there is also evidence for cultural variation. And there are good reasons for this as well. As with most human mechanisms and capacities there is complexity and *flexibility*. Many aspects of emotional functioning can be *shaped differently* by different cultures.⁷

An answer to the question regarding cultural versus biological-genetical determinants of *emotions* and *conceptions* of emotions, thus, must be complex and separated into several factors. There probably are *both* universals and cultural specifics with regard to most aspects of emotional functioning, and conceptions of emotional functioning. I *expect* certain *differences* – between individuals and cultures – concerning the emotions of anger and sadness and the conceptions of them, but also a great deal of *similarities*.

Now, let us first turn to individual variation.

3. INDIVIDUAL VARIATION

There are significant *differences* in how individuals conceive of an emotional situation involving anger or sadness⁸ – whether directly experienced or presented in a story or in a film etc. Consider the following (fictive) examples where the individuals W, Y and Z

⁷ Such shaping may be necessary, to enable human beings to live in (various) modern societies and cope with modern circumstances of life. It is worth noticing that there will be a problem of adaption, in this sense, as the conditions of life, under which human beings live today, differ in essential aspects from the circumstances to which we are biologically adapted.

⁸ Compare a study by Harris and Lipian (1989), who investigated differences in how healthy children and children in hospitals, respectively, conceive of feelings of sadness and depression. They found significant differences concerning, for instance, conceptions of 'coping strategies', of 'mixed feelings' and of the possibility to hide emotions.

differ in their explanations, interpretations, and so on, of an emotional situation/reaction:

(1) Is it good or bad that this person expresses his anger towards his friend in this situation? What consequences will it have?

Y: It is not good. It may be difficult for him to get together again after blowing up in that way, and there is a risk that the relation with the friend will be damaged.

W: It is good. He can finally get rid of some frustration, and there is a possibility of having a more honest relation with the friend.

(2) Why did this person show her anger?

Y: Because she is an unbalanced person; she could not control herself.

W: Because she is sensitive; she felt that now it was too much and released her feelings.

(3) What is a good way to deal with this situation? How should the person try to deal with her feeling of sadness?

W: She must be strong, stronger than the sadness itself; not subdue to it, not let it take over.

Y: Not do anything particular, there is nothing to do really, it will pass with time.

Z: She should try to understand the emotion, the background, care about her own feeling, that's the best way to get through it.

(4) Why does this person not show her sadness? And what consequences will this have?

Y: Because she is strong and can control herself. An important consequence is that she remains balanced and can just get on.

W: Because she cannot deal with her own emotions. An important consequence is that she keeps it bottled up, that she encapsulates her feelings.

The question, now, is whether *cognitive differences* (differences in explanations, predictions, attitudes) concerning emotions – as in the examples above – can, to some extent, be related to *different conceptual metaphors* for emotions.

'Related to' can mean the following:

- that *cognitive differences* can – by cognitive scientists and cognitive linguists – in an *illuminating* way be correlated with *different conceptual metaphors* (weakest hypothesis)

- that individuals who, concerning one emotional situation or event have a *different* focus, *different* interpretations, *different* attitudes, etc., will *prefer different* cognitive metaphors, if given a choice, and will more easily or more likely *formulate* their interpretations, attitudes, evaluations, etc., in terms related to these respectively *different* conceptual metaphors

- that in *different thought processes* – in the actual *formation* of interpretations and attitudes and in the *gaining* of conclusions – *different* conceptual metaphors may be involved, and that, furthermore, it may be possible to *influence* a person's direction of thought by prompting certain conceptual metaphors (strongest hypothesis)

These different meanings of 'related to' are exemplified in the fictive examples below:⁹

- The attitude that, in a certain situation, it is adequate to show intense anger, and the attitude that it is not, may be correlated – respectively – to a conceptual metaphor of intense anger as *pressure that sometimes must be released*, and to a conceptual metaphor of showing intense anger as *loosing grip of a dangerous animal* (cf. example (1), page. 4).

- The idea that it is damaging for oneself to express intense anger, and the idea that it is healthy, may – respectively – be correlated to a conceptual metaphor of expressing anger as *loosing one's composure* or as *falling apart*, and to a conceptual metaphor of expressing anger as *venting bad air* (cf. example (1), page 4).

- If one individual believes there is no way to really influence sadness, whereas another believes that sadness goes away quicker if one actively focuses the emotion and its background, they may also have different preferences concerning metaphorical descriptions of situations of sadness; for instance, the first, but not the second, preferring descriptions of sadness as a *natural force* (e.g. 'it came over me, and then was like gone with the wind', 'there was this flood of emotion', 'I just felt engulfed by sadness') over descriptions of sadness as *an object to handle or deal with* ('I felt I had to take care of

⁹For some *nonfictive* examples, concerning some other domains, see Gentner's (1983a, 1987) studies on how people think about and reason of electricity, and of evaporation.

this feeling', 'it was clear that I needed some emotional repair') (cf. example (3), page 4).

- A and B are presented with a scenario where a person does not show her anger, but A and B get different 'metaphorical framings: 'she could *handle* the situation' versus 'she *encapsulated* all her anger'. This may also have influences on A's and B's respective directions of thought, for instance, on what they consider to be the most important consequences of the reaction; it may influence the formation of their attitudes towards the behaviour, etc. (cf. example (4), page 4).

Observe that it is clear that when human beings *describe* and *talk about* emotional situations and reactions, they commonly *use metaphorical language* (conventionalized and not conventionalized). But the question is to what extent this metaphorical language, that is used for speaking about and describing emotions, really *reflects* the *beliefs, thoughts and attitudes* of language users.¹⁰

In this context, three hypotheses, that are all central in cognitive semantics as well as in cognitive anthropology and cognitive psychology, can be distinguished:

- (i) There is a considerable correspondence between cognitive structures (deep structures) as coded in *language*, on the one hand, and as coded in *other conceptual structures and processes*, on the other hand – and this is true, in particular, for *metaphors*.
- (ii) *Metaphors* play an important role in *everyday understanding* and *everyday communication*, in having an active role in the structuring of knowledge in various cognitive processes.
- (iii) *Metaphors* are *productive*. They are not just a passive format for already existing cognitive products but can provide the understander with *new, previously unrecognized* entailments and give rise to heretofore *unconsidered* interpretations, and stimulate more or less creative thinking.¹¹

¹⁰Compare Ortony (1988).

¹¹Quinn (1991) questions the hypothesis of the productivity of metaphors in everyday understanding. On the basis of her studies on conceptions of marriage in American culture she finds the productivity of metaphors in everyday understanding to be marginal. Metaphorical *thinking* has no prominent place in peoples understanding and thinking about everyday and familiar topics. Instead, she says, people follow certain well-worn tracks of quanderies common in their culture. They usually have the reasoning they want to do in mind – and *then* they may *cast this* in a metaphor.

The alternative to the view presented in these three hypotheses is that *everyday metaphorical language* is not more than a decorative envelope that, at most, carries some shallow associations between words, but does not have any deeper (that is, more structured, flexible, richer) cognitive effects.

4. CULTURAL VARIATION

There are several studies within anthropology, crosscultural psychology and psychiatry on conceptions of emotions in different cultures and on *universals* versus *cultural specifics* in these conceptions.

C. Lutz (1982, 1985, 1987) has investigated the conceptualization of emotion in the people of Ifaluk – a small atoll in the Western Caroline Islands of Micronesia. Lutz stresses how these conceptions are embedded in culture specific knowledge, and notes considerable differences between American and Ifaluk conceptions, for instance, the following:

(a) The idea of '*control*' – 'to control an emotion' – does not play the same role in the Ifaluk as in the American conception of emotion. In the American's concept, it is *central* that an emotion is something that can be controlled in a variety of ways – that can be hidden, held back, etc. And *unexpressed* emotions are not something unusual. In the Ifaluk concept, on the other hand, it is central that an emotion with almost no exception is expressed.¹²

(b) Whereas an American who tries to understand, and explain, what, for instance, anger or sadness is, in general will focus on private, internal happenings, and the particular experiential and physiological feeling of the emotion, the Ifaluk conceptions of an emotion is centered around the kind of events or situations in which it occurs.

M. Rosaldo (1980) has studied the Ilognot tribe, in northern Luzon on the Philippines, and their distinctive conception of anger. '*Liget*', roughly translated as 'energy/anger/passion', is conceived of by the Ilognot as a positive force, which is especially potent in young men. Furthermore, it is thought of as a force that demands to be *fostered* and *cultivated*. It is not a natural capacity of the infant, but the elders of the tribe deliberately foster the expression of *liget* in young men, by mediating and explaining their skills and experiences, for instance, in head-hunting. Such a conception of anger can be contrasted with the views in several other cultures, where anger and expressions

¹²One action that is commonly linked to any emotion, says Lutz, is to 'tell someone about the emotion'. Control becomes an issue only in special circumstances.

of anger are viewed as something negative, and where cultivation and fostering is rather aimed at *holding back* or *counteracting* anger and expressions of anger (for instance in Japan).

Rosaldo puts forth the hypothesis that, in general, *the way feelings function* among the Ilognot is different from the way they work in Western cultures. She suggests that *defense mechanisms*, such as repression, displacement, the hiding of affects, projection, frustration, etc. are *Western* phenomena, products of a specific cultural way of thinking. That is, these emotional phenomena and forms of control – and corresponding *conceptions* of emotions and of emotional control – are cultural specific constructions. This stands in contrast to a view of these as general and universal techniques or strategies to deal with emotions; as *biologically based* control or defense mechanisms. (See, for instance, Spiro (1984).)

Amongst approaches that stress the universals in conceptions of emotions, one finds several developmental–psychological studies, which present evidence that at least some conceptions of emotions develop according to a culture invariant pattern. It does indeed vary between cultures to what extent emotional expressions are encouraged, and what emotional expressions are admitted. Nevertheless, the development of certain *general* conceptions and ideas – for instance, of control of emotions, relationship between expressed emotion, on the one hand, and internal, private, experienced emotion, on the other hand – seems to follow a pattern which is independent of the particular culture in which individual lives and grows. (See, for instance, Gardner, Harris, Ohtmoto and Hamazaki (1988).) Or, as another example, the apprehension that emotional reactions initially are intense and gradually wane in strength, develop around the age of 4 in children, irrespective of whether they are growing up in the West, or within an Oriental culture. In other words, the gradual waning of intense emotion is a universal of human experience, and young children everywhere rapidly discover that regularity and form a conception of this. (Harris, Guz, Lipian, and Man-Shu (1985)).

We also find a number of investigations by the psychologists Ekman et al. In one of these, individuals – adults and children – in several different cultures were given the task of pairing pictures, showing facial expression for different emotions, with simple stories (Ekman and Friesen (1971)). There was a great concordance in the classification of these emotions and in the conceptions of antecedents for and conditions around the occurrence of them.

The anthropologist R. Shweder (1985) is neither a ‘universalist’ nor a ‘cultural relativist’. One the one hand he, for instance, points to *differences* in *conceptions of anger* between the Eskimos, who view *anger*

as something that only children experience, and for working class Americans, who believe that *anger* helps you overcome fear and attain independence. There will be differences, he contends, in how one *thinks* and *reasons* about anger and in what it means to be angry in these cultures. On the other hand, Shweder discusses several possible *universals* in conceptions of emotion. For instance, he refers to R. D’Andrade’s and F. Egan’s study (1974) which presents evidence that certain conceptions that relate different emotions to different colors seem *not* to vary, either historically or crossculturally. Furthermore, he states that he would not be surprised if the following conceptions were universal: that *anger* suggests *explosion*, *destruction* and *revenge*; that *fear* suggests *flight*; that *sadness* suggests *loss* and *withdrawal* etc. Also in his own historical–phenomenologically based analysis of conceptions of *depression*, he points to possible universals such as *emptiness*; *passiveness*; *weakness*; *a body that has lost its soul*; *being down, low, blue, cold, dried out* etc. Finally, referring to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Shweder comments that there are good reasons to suspect that the metaphorical meanings of a basic orientational dimension like ‘down’ and ‘up’, which play a role in many conceptions of emotions, are not culturally relative.

A similarly balanced view concerning universals versus cultural specifics in conceptions of emotions, can be found in R. D’Andrade’s work. In the paper ‘A folk model of the mind’ (1987), he presents his research on what he calls ‘the European–American or “western” folk-model of mind’. In one section he discusses the relation between this western model of mind, in particular, concerning emotions, and the *Ifaluk* model of emotions which Lutz describes (compare above). According to the *Ifaluk* model, unpleasant emotions that are not expressed, may cause illness: One is advised to ‘throw out’ one’s feelings to avoid illness. But the conception of a relation between emotions and illness is also, D’Andrade notes, part of the western folk model. For instance, you can imagine that someone gets ill because he/she is longing for someone, or that someone is ‘homesick’; you can imagine that intense anger may lead to a heartattack, or that someone is so sad of having lost someone, that he/she can ‘pine away’, and so on. It is just that the model that is used on *Ifaluk* makes the relation between illness and emotions more *general and explicit*. There are, according to D’Andrade, *some* significant differences between the two cultural models (like that there is more blending of ‘thought and emotion’ in the *Ifaluk* model, and that the interpersonal role of emotion is more distinctly conceptualized in the *Ifaluk* than in the western model), but, *in general*, he contends, both models seem to have a similar framework. Maybe, he suggests, different cultural models of mind, and in

particular of emotions, are like different cultural models of colour, such as B. Berlin and P. Kay (1969) have described them: There are certain *salient* areas of an experiential field, that are universally recognized and paid attention to, or even focused on, but then there is variation between cultures as to how the rest of the field is partitioned; to which degree the total field is differentiated and how borders and boundaries between areas are drawn.

Particularly relevant for the present study is, of course, research concerning conceptions of emotions and emotional control in the *Japanese, American and Swedish cultures*.

First of all, there are certain popular *stereotypes*, or folk ideas, concerning emotions in these cultures and of differences between them. For instance, the following between the Japanese and the American cultures:

- Japanese are much less emotionally expressive than Americans. There is a *contrast* between the inscrutable oriental hiding emotions behind a politely smiling face, and the free expression or even accentuation of emotion that appears to be popular in at least some American subcultures.
- Japanese are, in particular, much more restrictive than Americans with displaying *negative* emotions.
- In the Japanese culture, the harmony of the group is highly valued, also when this requires a suppression or holding back of individual expression, whereas the American culture puts an emphasis on the freedom of the *individual*, in particular, freedom to express one's thoughts and emotions.
- Japanese avoid conflicts, whereas the Americans create and even search conflicts and confrontations.

Concerning the Swedes, the popular stereotypes about Swedish people place them 'in between', maybe with more similarity to 'the Japanese way'. Professor Å. Daun, author of 'Swedish Mentality' (1990) says in a newspaper interview: "[Swedish people] want to be friendly and not hurt others by telling them they are wrong. In the beginning foreigners find this very pleasant – but after some time they change this opinion and begin to view Swedes as dishonest, in the way we can view Japanese; incessantly and continually smiling and bowing."

Some empirical investigations support these stereotypes.¹³ Evidence that Japanese are more restrictive in displaying negative emotions is given in Ekman's famous study (1973), where he let Americans and Japanese watch the same unpleasant film and filmed them. In the semi-darkness in the room there were no differences in display of surprise, disgust, sadness or anger in facial expressions, but in the subsequent interviews, the Americans showed similar expressions of discomfort and distress that they had displayed when watching, whereas the Japanese spoke about the film maintaining a smiling or positive expression.

Another example is J. Hendry's (1986) studies of children at Japanese and American Kindergarten, respectively. Japanese children, Hendry notes, get a much more *explicit* fostering and education in *controlling their emotions* than American children, and this education takes place earlier. Because of differences in languages, furthermore, the Japanese children are given *more distinct verbal* distinctions between private thoughts and feelings, on the one hand, and the 'face' shown to the world, on the other.

Finally, K. Scherer, D. Matsumoto, H. Wallbott and T. Kudoh (1988) in their investigation of emotional experience¹⁴ in Europe, Japan and USA, find support, for instance, for the difference in emotional expressiveness. The general picture indicates that Japanese have the comparatively lowest degree of emotional expressiveness, while the Americans are highly expressive compared to the other two cultures. Another result from their investigation is that the Japanese report substantially fewer physiological symptoms in connection with anger and sadness than Americans and European. This difference, the authors propose, is probably not due to a *biological* difference but may be due to different cultural display rules which produce differences in attempts to control the appearance of arousal.

Now, the question is whether a cultural variation in conceptions of emotions – in particular, conceptions of anger and sadness – may have some correspondance in a cultural variation in metaphors (conceptual and linguistic).

It *might* be shown, for instance

¹³In this context, note the following: Empirical investigations are needed in order to separate stereotypes that have an empirical base (a correspondance to actual behaviour and experiences, or to cultural ideals) from stereotypes that are but ungrounded clichés. (Compare Barnlund (1989)).

¹⁴In particular, of sadness, anger, joy and fear.

- that a more common negative attitude towards the display of anger or sadness correlates with more, and more frequent use of, metaphors that *imply* negative consequences of display of emotions, or carry negative connotations
- that more frequent predictions that the display of anger or sadness will make the emotion disappear is correlated with more frequent occurrences of linguistic and conceptual metaphors that facilitate or suggest such lines of reasoning
- that a standard expression, in a culture, of 'becoming angry or sad' as '*falling into* anger or sadness' correlates with a common belief that the occurrence of these emotions is not something that is or can be easily influenced or 'controlled'
- that a variation in *how much*, in different cultures, one does discuss bodily effects of anger and grief, and *which ones*, correlates with corresponding variation in linguistic and conceptual metaphors.

In connection with the last point, there is anthropological evidence that standard expressions of *bodily complaints* associated with *depression* vary a great deal: Nigerians complain that 'ants keep creeping in parts of the brain' while Chinese complain of 'their heart being squeezed and weighed down' (Kleinman, A. and B. Good, 1985), Swedes and Americans of 'having a heavy heart', and Vai of 'having a liver that is not good'. For *being angry* we find the standard Japanese expressions of 'my stomach stands' and 'you are in my head'. In Vai one 'has a bitter liver', in American English one can 'burst a blood vessel', 'get a hemorrhage' and 'get hot under the collar'.

So far, the comparison between *Japanese*, *Swedish* and *American* linguistic metaphors for anger and grief, and the control and display of these emotions, indicates that at least many 'main' conceptual metaphors can be found in all three culture- and language-domains (such as anger as *heat in a container*, expressing it as *exploding*, anger as an *angry animal*, and control of anger as *bridling this animal*, grief as an *illness*, grief disappearing as an *illness disappearing*, sadness as a *burden*, expression of sadness as a *relief of this burden*, etc.) but that there seems to be a variation in the *wealth* of *linguistic expressions* around these conceptual metaphors, in their *colourfulness*, in how *commonly* they are used, in their *connotations*, and so on.

5. ON HOW TO INVESTIGATE THE ISSUES

Thus, I am interested in the issues of individual and cultural variation in conceptions of anger and sorrow, and the role of metaphor in this variation. More specifically, I will

- on the level of individuals, seek to relate a *difference* in the explanations, predictions or attitudes of two individuals concerning a particular situation involving anger or sorrow, to *different* conceptual metaphors, and
- on the cultural level, seek to relate a *variation* in ways of reasoning and attitudes dealing with anger and sorrow to a *variation* in metaphors – conceptual and linguistic – between the chosen culture- and language-domains.

It is important to note that, in contrast to many related studies, the project I am involved in has a *focus* not on emotional experiences and emotional reactions *as such* but on *conceptions* of emotions and emotional reactions.

How might, then, the issues be investigated?

I suggest the following three studies.

(1) First, to investigate conceptions of anger and grief in the three cultures by means of interviews. The interviews should center around conceptions of the *management* of anger and grief, and, specifically, conceptions of the *display* or *non-display* of anger and grief: *Why* does one person display anger or grief, and another person not? What *consequences* do the respective behaviours have? *Should* one *try* to show (not show) these emotions? What is most *appropriate*? Even though this investigation is not a *direct* investigation of *metaphors* one may seek to set up preliminary hypotheses about *conceptual metaphors* on the basis of expressions and ways of reasoning found in the answers of the participants.

(2) Second, to conduct a *linguistic and psycholinguistic study* of metaphorical expressions for anger and grief in the three languages. The expressions should be analysed both as *linguistic material* and *psycholinguistically* in order to find out how *common* various expressions are, what *connotations* they have, *when* they are used, if they present or convey certain attitudes, what lines of reasoning they tend to facilitate, support or suggest¹⁵, and so on. In this

¹⁵In particular as concerns the (causes and consequences of) display/non-display of anger and grief.

study hypotheses about *conceptual metaphors* will be *central*.

(3) Third, to conduct a *testbased study*, to *more directly study the role of metaphor* in conceptual processes concerning anger and grief. It may be studied in, for instance, some of the following cognitive contexts: descriptions, explanations and predictions; attitudes and explanations; the ability to 'see another perspective, see another point of view'; intra- and inter-cultural communication with metaphors; memory. The testbased study, note, should base upon the two other investigations, and combine results from these.

I will give some more comments on the three investigations:

(1) The *interviews*, I suggest, should be centered around *vignettes*, in the form of picture series with simple text and as neutral as possible with respect to metaphors, that illustrate situations of anger or sadness and different emotional reactions. (For some examples of vignette texts, see appendix A.)

A vignette method has certain advantages over interviews where participants are asked about self-experienced emotional events.

First, it implies a *specification* of the concepts 'anger' and 'sadness' – and one which is *the same* for all participants. That is, they are all given the same example, which is not the case when they are interviewed about self-experienced situations. This leads to a reduced variation in input for the participants.

Second, there are of course difficulties of translation between the three languages, which may produce undesired variation in input to the participants. But by using vignettes, which also contain pictures and illustrate an entire situation, it is possible, to some extent, to minimize this difficulty.

A third advantage with interviews concerning fictive stories as compared to discussing the participants' own experiences is that the tendency to answer questions about personal material is generally lower than for questions about more neutral material ('third-person-material') and that with personal material there is a greater risk that various defense mechanisms influence the answers.

(2) For the *linguistic and psycholinguistic study* I suggest two parts:

- To collect *linguistic metaphors* for anger and grief in the three languages, and to analyse them with help of hypotheses about conceptual metaphors. In particular, they shall be analysed with respect to the aspects of control and

display of these emotions: Does the metaphor (implicitly) imply that one *normally does try* or *should try* to refrain from displaying anger or grief? Is it suited to describe *certain explanations* for the display or non-display of anger or sadness? Does it lend itself more easily to describing *certain consequences* of the display or non-display of these emotions?

- To collect further information about these linguistic metaphors: What *associations* do the various metaphors lead to? What *connotations* do they have? How *common* are they in everyday discourse?

For both parts it will be useful to work with existing collections and analyses of metaphors. (For instance, Kövecses' and Lakoff's collections of metaphors, Hiuy hyougen jiten (Japanese metaphorical dictionary), Averill's *Six metaphors of emotion and their theoretical extensions*, Barcelona Sanchez' *On the concept of depression in American English*.)

In this study, thus, two things may be analysed:

- cultural variation with respect to linguistic metaphors for grief and anger
- possible connections between *such* cultural variation and the cultural variation concerning conceptions of and ways of reasoning about anger and grief, found in the interviewbased investigation

(3) Finally consider the *test-based investigation*. The tests – as well as the interviews – will involve the use of *vignettes* or *stories* that illustrate situations of sadness or anger. Each vignette will exist in a *neutral version* (of the same kind as in the interviews) but also as:

- *Language–metaphorical versions*: In these versions the vignette texts contain metaphorical expressions. For instance, in a vignette about someone who does not show how sad he feels, metaphorical expressions such as 'he puts the lid on', 'he is capable of handling his feelings', 'he encapsulates his sadness', 'he can master his sorrow'; or for a vignette about someone who is just about to express his anger towards someone, metaphorical expressions such as 'he is about to explode', 'he has to vent his anger', 'he has to air his feelings', 'he cannot control his feelings', etc. (For more examples, see appendix B.)

- *Image–metaphorical versions*: In these versions the metaphors are not linguistically but pictorially presented, without any

accompanying metaphorical text. (See appendix C.)

A metaphorical presentation that describes/depicts some behaviour as 'positive' (good, appropriate, adequate, justifiable) I call 'a *positive metaphorical framing or presentation*'; and one that depicts the behaviour as 'negative' (not adequate, not desirable, blameworthy) I call a '*negative metaphorical framing or presentation*'. (See appendix B.)

Below I will sketch three *examples* of tests. The final design of such tests, however, and also the choice of *types* of tests, should depend upon the results of the interviewbased study and the linguistic and psycholinguistic study, and on decisions concerning applications.

Test 1: 'Descriptions, explanations, predictions'

The participants are presented with a pair of vignettes, that illustrates a difference in emotional reactions (for instance, so that the person in both vignettes gets angry and attempts not to show this but that, finally, *one* of them nevertheless does so, the other not). This difference is *metaphorically* presented. Different groups of participants get *different* metaphorical framings. The tasks are the following: To *describe* the difference illustrated in the vignettes; to *explain* the behaviour of respective person; to indicate *the consequences* of the respective behaviours; to *predict* the continuation of the vignettes.

The intention will be to find out whether different metaphorical framings may evoke different conceptual metaphors, which are evidenced in the participants' ways of reasoning. An hypothesis is that there would be *differences* between different conceptual metaphors, for instance:

- different ways of reasoning about someone who 'is just about to explode' than about someone who 'is about to vent his feelings'
- different views about the consequences of a behaviour in a situation where someone is viewed as 'venting his anger' or 'loosing grip of his anger', respectively
- different attitudes towards a behaviour that is conceptualized as 'attempting not to loose face' or as 'supressing/opressing one's feelings'
- different predictions about the consequences of a behaviour conceptualized as 'encapsulating her sadness' or 'turning her sadness inwards' or 'managing to handle her sorrow'
- different explanations of an unhappy person's reactions if the sadness is viewed as 'a heavy

burden' or as 'a lump in the throat' or as 'a cloud in her sky'

Test 2: 'Attitudes and explanations'

The participants are presented with a number of vignettes that illustrate a person who displays anger or sadness. 1/3 of the participants get neutral presentations, 1/3 get negative framings and 1/3 get positive framings. The task is to answer the question 'does the person behave appropriately?' with 'yes' or 'no' or 'doubtful' and give a motivation for the answer. In this way one can investigate whether metaphorical framing – via conceptual metaphors – influences attitudes and ways of reasoning (motivations, explanations).

Test 3: 'See another point of view'

The participants get some vignettes illustrating anger- and sadness-situations. All presentations are neutral. The task is to answer questions about the appropriateness of the behaviour of the story characters. If some of the participants give a similar answer for one vignette, then these participants will receive further questions, of the following kind: 'You did not find this behavior appropriate, but can you think of circumstances where it is appropriate to show ones anger?' 'You did not find this behavior appropriate, but can you think of circumstances where it is appropriate to vent one's anger?' 'You found this reaction appropriate, but can you think of negative consequences with not showing ones sadness?' 'You found this reaction appropriate, but can you think of negative consequences with encapsulating ones sadness?' Half of the group gets neutral questions, the other half gets a metaphorical 'contra-framing'.¹⁶ The intention will be to see whether metaphorical 'contra-framing' may influence people's ways of reasoning and, possibly, make it easier to 'see another perspective', by means of comparing subjects who originally had similar answers and attitudes, where some of them, not others, get a metaphorical contra-framing.

6. ON CULTURAL VERSUS INDIVIDUAL KNOWLEDGE

The investigation of *individual variation* and the investigation of *cultural variation* in the conceptualization of grief and anger are not two separate and independent studies. Instead, they

¹⁶That is, the questions are 'framed' with a metaphor/some metaphors that are *contrary* to the original answers and reasoning. For instance: 'Can it not be good to air ones feelings?' 'Can not loosing of control have bad consequences?' 'Can you think of a situation where it is good to ventilate one's anger?' etc.

constitute a significant complement to one another. In a study of *cultural* variation, which is partly based on interviews with individuals, one *has* to consider questions of *individual* variation; and questions about *individual* variation are illuminated and enriched by being seen against a background of knowledge of *cultural* variation. The combination of investigations on these two levels is particularly interesting as concerns the issue of *the cognitive force of metaphors*: To what extent may this force be a ‘cultural’ one, that is, a mediation of attitudes, ways of thinking, traditions and norms by means of ‘linguistic and cultural conditioning’? And to what extent are these metaphors (also) tools for the more variable cognitive development of each individual and her more or less creative attempts to understand and structure her experiences and her knowledge, and even *question* things or ‘think anew’?

When one investigates a variation in conceptualization and knowledge on *both* these levels, however, it is important to have a general idea of *the relation* between *knowledge in individuals* and *cultural knowledge*.¹⁷

Cultural knowledge of a domain, such as the domain of emotions, can be seen as a *pool* of collected knowledge and understanding, that is found within a cultural community. Such knowledge is collected over historical time and coded in many ways. It is evidenced in the behaviour and strategies of people, in their thinking, in everyday and professional discourse, in literature and theater, in metaphors, in proverbs, in lyrics and music, and so on. A *cultural model* is a kind of relatively coherent, sometimes simplified, model that can *tie together many* such examples of cultural knowledge.¹⁸

But note that a cultural model, in this sense, not is something that *any* individual has *in her mind*. A *cognitive model*, which binds together conceptions and knowledge in *an individual*, and that the individual uses to interpret and construct her world and make sense of her experiences, will rather be an *elaborated* and *partial* version of a cultural model. As all *knowledge structures in an individual*, it is

constrained and specified by the individual’s *particular* biography, experiences, interests, profession, and so on.

Cultural models function, I believe, as *frameworks* for the construction of *individuals’ cognitive models*, and in the end it is the *interplay* between cognitive models and the more or less shared, public knowledge, made explicit in cultural models, that allows people to *communicate*, within – and between – cultures.

7. RELATION TO OTHER INVESTIGATIONS

There is, of course, an important relationship between the research ideas sketched above and the studies that were the original source of inspiration for the entire project, namely, Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) studies of conceptual metaphors, and Lakoff and Kövecses’ (1987) work on the concept of anger and on conceptual metaphors involved in this concept.¹⁹ The present study can, however, be regarded as a *complementary* approach for studying conceptual metaphors, in that I do not limit the methods to *linguistic* analysis, but will use other, and in a sense more *direct* methods for investigating the *cognitive* role of metaphors.^{20, 21}

Other important sources of inspiration concerning the role of metaphors in cognitive processes in understanding and reasoning are D. Gentner (1982, 1983a, 1983b, 1985, 1987) and N. Quinn (1987, 1991). Gentner, on her own and in collaboration with others, has done several theoretical and empirical studies; for instance, on how people explain and reason about electricity, using a ‘flowing fluid’- or ‘teeming croud’-model (1983), and on people’s recalling stories, when they are given analogical or metaphorical cues for them (1985). Quinn has conducted several studies on the understanding of marriage, or conceptions of marriage, in the American culture.

Furthermore, there are important tangents to several of the anthropological and psychological studies I

¹⁷The discussion in this section is inspired by a discussion with R. Keesing and the reading of his paper ‘Models, “folk” and “cultural”’ (1987).

¹⁸One can think of the relation *between* cultural models as various kinds of nestings. Cultural models can be organized hierarchically, in that the parts of any cultural model can be unpacked into further complex subparts. Certain cultural models may serve as parts of many other cultural models. A cultural model of emotion may, for instance, be part of a cultural model of mind, and of a cultural model of personal relationships, and it can contain or overlap with a cultural model of mental illness, contain a cultural model of grief, and so on.

¹⁹Kövecses presents a continuation of the research on concept of emotions in his book (1990).

²⁰Thus, one can hope to gain some further information about the *character* and *status* of ‘conceptual metaphors’.

²¹Also, my test methods differ from those that the cognitive linguist R. Gibbs (1990) uses: In Gibbs’ experiments, the *tasks* are generally centered around *linguistic expressions* (in particular, *linguistic metaphors*) whereas I will also conduct experiments where the tasks is *not* primarily to understand or interpret a *linguistic expression* but rather to interpret *a situation* or *a reaction*, as presented in a story, and to reason about this. Furthermore, I will not only use *linguistic* but also *pictorial* presentations of metaphors.

have mentioned above, in sections 3 and 4: the studies by R. D'Andrade, P. Ekman et al., P. Harris et al., J. Hendry, C. Lutz, A. Ortony, K. Scherer et al., and R. Shweder.

8. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY – HOW CAN THIS KNOWLEDGE BE USED?

I have three kinds of goals: (1) knowledge goals (2) methodological goals and (3) application goals.

(1) *Knowledge goals*: To gain more knowledge about cultural and individual variation and similarities in conceptions of anger and sadness in the three cultures; and to gain knowledge about the role conceptual metaphors play in these conceptions.

(2) *Methodological goals*: To develop methods for gaining this knowledge.

The methods and techniques to be used are partly untested/novel. This concerns, for instance, the use of pictorial presentation of metaphors. I want to stress, therefore, that a main part of the work is to *develop and test* methods and experimental material.

(3) *Application goals*: To develop this research in an application oriented direction.

I see several such possibilities. The 'overarching purpose' of these applications can be summed up as 'facilitating the communication of different conceptions between individuals', but the communicative contexts may differ, eg. being cross- or intra-cultural.

For the particular area of *emotion* and *communication* about emotion, I work with the following (background) hypotheses:

- Communication about emotional issues is important in certain situations, in particular in counseling situations, both in a professional context (between counselor and client) or in a non-professional context (between friends, between family members, between partners, etc.).
- But communication concerning emotions is sometimes problematic, when different conceptions stand against each other.
- In particular, communication concerning emotional issues can be difficult if the communicating individuals have different cultural backgrounds.
- It is useful to be able to understand several alternative views, or different perspectives, on

an emotional issue ²², and to present and communicate such views.

- The use of metaphors can be a good means for presenting and communicating various perspectives.

I will now discuss some examples of application oriented studies based upon these hypotheses, first considering cross-cultural communication and then intra-cultural communication.²³

(1) One example of a development of the research towards an application in the domain of *cross-cultural* communication is to study conceptions and attitudes concerning sadness and anger and emotional control in counselors, social workers, immigration assistants, priests, in the three cultures. Note that these are groups of people who in their professions will make extensive use of their conceptions in counseling other people. The purpose is to try to facilitate communication between counselor and client where they have different cultural backgrounds. Such counseling situations are becoming increasingly common. A growing number of people live for a period of time in another country – studying, working as trainees, etc. – and may come to a situation where they need some kind of counseling. Such a study can also be related to some research in anthropology and crosscultural psychology and psychiatry, such as the research presented in the volume *Culture and depression* (1985, eds. A. Kleinman and B. Good), where it is asked to what extent disease categories in connection with emotional disturbances may be culturally shaped. 'Depression', some researchers suggest, is a cultural category grounded in a Western intellectual and medical tradition.

It should be observed that a cultural variance in emotions and emotional reactions, and in *conceptions* of emotions and emotional reactions may play a role in *many different contexts*, not only in communication of a relatively *personal* character (as in communication between partners, or friends of different cultural background, or as in counseling situations, between friends, or between client and counselor, as described above) but also in contexts of *business* or economical character; in *cultural exchange*; in *political discussions*, and so on. In all these contexts various emotional reactions and conceptions of emotional reactions will figure. If not anger or sorrow, there will be irritation, impatience,

²² Like, for instance, knowledge of several alternative ways of coping with an emotion

²³ But of course applications ought not to be *specified* until a later stage, when there are more results – concerning the role of metaphor in communication, about possibilities of mediating different perspectives and stimulating creative thinking by means of metaphor, and so on – to build upon.

disappointment, frustration, regret, and so on. Thus, knowledge about variation in emotional reactions and conceptions of them, and of possibilities of working with this – to mediate, to make someone aware of his own as well as the perspectives of others, and so on – can be useful. An overarching purpose, then, with this research is to gain knowledge and develop methods that can be of aid in improving the quality of communication; to further fruitful intercultural ‘mind-meetings’.²⁴

(2) Also *within* a cultural community conceptions of emotions and emotional reactions can stand against each other, in the communication between partners, friends, colleagues, and so on. Even if there is not a cultural variation, there may be individual variation. Thus, knowledge of such various conceptions and means of negotiating and communicating these conceptions, is useful. As an example, consider the following more specific possible application: To focus on conceptions of anger or sorrow and, in particular, of emotional control, in groups of individuals with particular problems, such as alcoholics or patients suffering from anorexia. (In both of these groups, there is some evidence for inadequate emotional functioning in this respect.) The purpose, here, is communicative and therapeutic, being based upon the assumption that it is possible to influence emotional reactions and emotional experiences via *conceptions* of emotional reactions. (Compare Harris and Lipian (1989) who have studied differences in how healthy children and children in hospitals, respectively, conceive of and understand emotions, in particular, feelings of sadness, depression and discomfort. They investigated the children’s conceptions of ‘mixed feelings’, of ‘coping strategies’ (ways of handling emotions), and of the possibility to hide emotions and their conceptions of oneself influencing one’s emotions.)

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²⁴General insights into the role of metaphor in conceptions and communicative processes may of course be applicable on other domains than emotion, such as conceptions of, for instance, contract/agreements, money, friendship, abortion, and so on.

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APPENDICES

*Appendix : The four pairs of vignettes*²⁵

(1)

• Peter is sitting in the park. He has been looking forward to a quiet and relaxing afternoon with a good book. But, he soon notices that it is not so quiet. There is someone with a radio nearby, and the volume is set quite high. This person also has a dog that is running around and making a nuisance of itself. Peter becomes irritated by this. He has tried to sit as far away as possible from the person and concentrate on his book. But he cannot help feeling irritated. The dog comes up to Peter and starts sniffing him. Peter becomes really angry. He has had enough. He takes his book and his jacket, gets up and goes over to the other person: "Do(n't) you realize that there are other people in the park besides you and your dog?" Peter is very angry, but you cannot really tell just by looking at him.

• Roger is sitting in the park. He has been looking forward to [...]

[...] He has had enough. He takes his book and his jacket, gets up and goes over to the other person: "Do(n't) you realize that there are other people in the park besides you and your dog?" Roger is very angry, and it shows by the tone of his voice, his facial expressions and his gestures.

(2)

• Robert is standing at the bus station waiting for his fiancé. They had agreed to meet there and then take the bus downtown to catch a movie. They have talked a lot about seeing this movie, and Robert is really looking forward to it. It is now 6:45, and Sally should have arrived on one of the buses that have already stopped at the station. Robert wonders where she could be. "Is she late again?" She knows that he hates being late to the movies. Robert becomes more and more irritated. It's almost ten minutes to seven! There goes the bus. Robert is angry. A minute later, he sees Sally getting out of a taxi and running towards him.

²⁵The vignette characters that get angry or sad are all *men*. It is likely that there are differences in ways of reasoning, attitudes – within and between cultures – regarding the behaviour (display, control etc) of angry or sad *women* and regarding behaviour of angry or sad *men*, respectively. To investigate and clarify this, one should, in my view, repeat *the entire* study with the same pairs of vignettes with all characters getting angry or sad being *women*. In the present study, however, I have chosen not to work with that variable.

Robert is furious inside, and you can see it and hear it when he says, “The bus has already left. I’m going home instead. I want to be by myself tonight.”

- Andrew is standing at the bus station waiting for his fiancé [...]

[...] There goes the bus. Andrew is angry. A minute later, he sees Mary getting out of a taxi and running towards him. Andrew is furious inside, but you cannot really tell by looking at him. He just says quite calmly, “The bus has already left. I’m going home instead. I want to be by myself tonight.”

(3)

- Simon has a best friend, John. They have known one another for a long time and are also colleagues. Simon and John get together quite often. Then suddenly, John decides that he is soon going to move to another part of the country. A week has passed since John informed Simon of his decision, and, during this time, Simon has felt sad and depressed. When moving-day comes around, Simon is really sad, and you can see it and hear it in his voice. When it is time for John to leave, Simon says, “Good-bye my friend, I’ll miss you.”

- Tim has a best friend, Alex. They have known one another for a long time and are also colleagues. [...]

[...] When moving-day comes around, Tim is really sad, but it doesn’t show. He sounds quite happy and looks quite happy too. When it is time for Alex to leave, Tim says, “Good-bye my friend, I’ll miss you.”

(4)

- Bill has just received a telephone call where his father told him that his mother doesn’t have long to live. Bill is shocked and feels deep sorrow. A short time later, the doorbell rings. It is Bill’s friend Tom, who has come over for a visit. Tom comes in, and they both sit down near the stereo as usual. Tom looks through the records. They talk as usual, but during this time, Bill is feeling extremely sad. After a while, Bill mentions the telephone call he got from his father, but he doesn’t reveal how sad he is./but you can’t see or hear how sad he is.

- Phil has just received a telephone call where his father told him [...]

[...] It is Bill’s friend Christer, who has come over for a visit. Christer comes in, and they both sit down near the stereo as usual. Christer looks through the records. They talk as usual, but during this time, Phil is feeling extremely sad. After a while, Phil mentions the telephone call, and he reveals how sad he is./ and you can see and hear how sad he is.

Appendix B: Examples of text-metaphorical framings or presentations

1. For vignette pair (2) above:

– ‘Andrew attempts to fight his anger’

– ‘Robert cannot handle his anger’

(positive framings or presentations of Andrews over Roberts behaviour)

– ‘Andrew encapsulates his anger’

– ‘Robert gives vent to his feelings’

(negative framings or presentation of Andrews over Robert’s behaviour)

2. For vignette pair (4) above

– ‘Bill does not loose face’

– ‘Phil looses his composure’

(positive framings or presentations of Bill’s over Phil’s behaviour)

– ‘Bill puts the lid on’

– ‘Phil airs his feelings’

(negative framings or presentations of Bill’s over Phil’s behaviour)

Appendix C: Examples of image-metaphorical framings or presentations